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rty was obtained fron Coder RBUTION, 1.. und Colonel WITCOIN, R renberg of.. Comittee emmointed to supervise the handing over to the Clinego 11lit ry Delegation of all ponere equipment.
(ii) The list of Jup.nose and Japanese-controlled ships furnished by the Joprnese in compliance with the Corrunder-in- Chief's General Order No. 1 h Joon used as the b. sic list: Identific. tion of the vessels on that list proved difficult, s in most o: ses the Japanese nobles r nubera of vossuls located
nd inspected and boon obliterated; in radition, any sn:11
t all.
were
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Jan Reso vessels 100, ted did not the r on the list Further difficulty encountered by the rty vas tracing tho nemier of disposal of certain vens 1s which known to Midve boen
1located to or propri tud by vid ng ora mi ationg and units, unter the toilTw of the most ant ereby tlc British vero to have tile turmor ry use of suck cuptured Japonesu in terial as they required pending its final delivory to the Chinoge.
TO overcone blis difficult, the Corey-More-in-Cl rye, KONG NOM I do a signal on October 14t to 11 concerned, instructing then to deposit all oz-Japanese oraît under their control in the typhoon refuge at KUMTI not later to noon on Monday, October 22nd. Lay cxceptio. 1 ones vlere surrender of craft
buld involve serious dislocation of carenti.1 services mers to be reported to the Comodoro, whose authority for retention of the craft in question 1.2 to be obtrined in osch specified c sc.
(iii) The party cornencel work on October 11th and, after a break on the 12th, resumed on the 13th and worked through to the 19th, with the result that the sigil quoted above come to its knowledge efter its labours had conced. This caused a change of proceedure to be adopted by Captain LIN, who t the commencement or operations had sot out (:) to inspect all vessels in the Arbour, with a vic, to identifying binge J. nese and obtaining wrticulars of other Jonese vesels fro. uthorities or units
on to have taken then into tempor.ry custody, (b) to lay claim, for the time being, to know Japanese vunsels only, (c) to take
rticulars of cny other vüssel Sc on the Chinese considerod blcy had a clein, (d) to
clain, (d) to low my Joy nope vossole in use or required for use to bo retui,od by bia cuthority or unit concerned, ting the precaution of recording details of the ve sels with a view to rer testing higher authority to decide, at later date,
hother and when the Doleg tion should obtea.. poaression, and (c) to ascenble any Japanose vessels not in use of required for use in the typhoon shelter at VULTI and off TAI YIT shipyard (north of the Cosmopolitan Dock).
(iv) After receipt of the sigm.l, the Chinese considered that compliance with that signal by 11 corned would provide the necessary information upon which to base negotiations for the delivery to then of vessels mot handed over. It s cccordingly decided that from that time onvrds only vessels obviously untended or under Chinese control should be investigatod.
(v) Two Japanese ships in the possession of Chinese cormeries woro seized by the party despite the obj otions of the corno. ies concerned, the party qcouling responsibiliøy for ita etions. The British officer with the rty experienced no little difficult in dicsurding the 1 tter from suizing also a number of other vessels under the control of servicus morgonuel or the "Alter Police.
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